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PLANNING FOR THE KAMIKAZES
 Operational gaming, which includes war gaming, in this context means a simulation that does not involve actual operations, one in which the flow of 
events affects and is affected by decisions made during the course of those events 
by players representing the roles of those involved in shaping the outcomes�1 In 
1957, operations analyst Clayton Thomas wrote that “there is no body of theory 
that sanctions the common use of operational gaming to seek a solution of a game 
through repeated plays�”2 Little in operational gaming has changed since then� 
The purpose of this article is to suggest possible 
approaches to, and the value of, repeated opera-
tional gaming, either by one institution repeating 
games or by accumulating data from games played 
anytime, anywhere to explore what is essentially 
the same contingency�
Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz in 1960 stated: 
“[T]he war with Japan had been re-enacted in 
the game rooms here [at the Naval War College] 
by so many people and in so many different ways 
that nothing that happened during the war was a 
surprise—absolutely nothing except the kamikaze 
tactics towards the end of the war; we had not 
visualized those�”3 Although this is an overstate-
ment, it is true that repeated operational games, at 
the tactical and strategic levels, did allow Nimitz 
to understand developments as they happened and 
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to adjust his strategy for fighting in the Pacific�4 By the start of World War II, 99 
percent of all USN flag officers were graduates of the College�5
This article proposes that repeated operational gaming provides an unpar-
alleled technique for predicting factors governing battles and campaigns and 
anticipating actions that would be reasonable for adversaries and allies / security 
partners to take, thus eliminating most surprises, thereby better informing op-
erational planning, force allocation, and force development�
Since 2003, the Naval War College has been conducting “Halsey” games with 
its students, similar to the way it was done at the College from shortly after 1887, 
when William McCarty Little introduced war gaming there, until World War II�6 
An analysis of the Halsey games, using some elements of game theory, suggests 
promising ways to learn from repeated gaming�
This article addresses a version of the questions that George H� Heilmeier, a 
highly respected director of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(1975–77), posed when he was determining whether to approve a new project�
WHAT ARE WE TRYING TO DO?
We are trying to understand the factors governing emergent developments in 
the real world through mastering the complexity created by the interaction of 
sentient actors—represented by role players, umpires, and game control—whose 
behavior, with an admixture of luck and the randomness of nature, affects what 
happens� More specifically, we are trying to develop understandings of how U�S� 
courses of action (COAs) would interact with those of both allies / security part-
ners and potential or actual adversaries to achieve U�S� security aims�
Specific cases include anticipating the strategies that potential adversaries 
such as the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), Russian military and para-
military forces, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and military forces, and Islamic 
militants would use against U�S� forces in combat, so as to develop appropriate 
capabilities to deter and, if necessary, defeat them�7 Armed conflict in the future 
also will involve a greater admixture of cyber and movements comprising small 
groups and individuals that can wreak havoc with terror and weapons of mass 
destruction at a level that only states could accomplish in the past� Over the past 
decade, Intelligence Community (IC) Title 50 authorities have become a larger 
component of operations that are still dominated by Department of Defense 
(DoD) Title 10 authorities in U�S� counterterrorism efforts� Improvements in our 
ability to identify and track “persons of interest” through advances in sources 
of information, including biometrics, and the processing of “big data” portend 
an expansion of “shadow wars” beyond counterterrorism as the United States 
extends these new tools to missions such as counterproliferation, counterintelli-
gence, and long-term competition with potential state adversaries� Going beyond 
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the war-gaming techniques of the period between the world wars, we are trying 
to anticipate future equivalents to the kamikazes�
This effort involves two major objectives� The first is to understand the logic of 
the competition under study to identify governing factors and anticipate how the 
key players may act� The second is to create a common vision and commitment 
to action among relevant policy makers and commanders� Gaming is a powerful 
method for simultaneously mastering complexity, enhancing communication, 
stimulating creativity, and contributing to consensus and a commitment to 
action�8
HOW IS THIS DONE AT PRESENT?
The major militaries of the world have used war gaming for over two centuries to 
simulate the logic of combat� Before the development of operations research (OR) 
in World War II, war gaming and field exercises were the primary techniques 
military organizations employed to create the synthetic experience of war� While 
using operational gaming to predict the outcomes of engagements is exceedingly 
problematic, given the number of factors not under the control of the partici-
pants, war gaming has a history of predicting accurately the factors governing 
battles and campaigns that actually emerged during subsequent operations�9 War 
gaming was a continuing activity at places such as the Naval War College and 
within German and Japanese military commands, by which participants studied 
operational challenges during the years between the world wars�
Following World War II, computer-based combat and campaign simulation 
largely replaced war gaming within the Pentagon, although the earlier practice 
continued in military colleges and operational commands� Repeated operational 
gaming within DoD is rare today� Although many institutions within DoD game 
elements of the same contingencies, these institutions and their supporting con-
tractors have few incentives to share game details and outcomes�10
As noted, the role of war gaming in military decision making diminished sig-
nificantly from the World War II era with DoD’s adoption of OR’s cousin, systems 
analysis� DoD largely turned to computerized combat and campaign simulations 
for operational, force, and procurement program planning� The models used in 
these simulations are direct descendants of those developed during World War 
II� When computerized combat simulations are used for operational planning, 
the forces and systems available are generally fixed, and alternative operational 
courses of action are explored; when these simulations are used for systems 
analysis, the operational concepts are fixed, and alternative systems are explored� 
This process does not capture the coevolution of technology and operational con-
cepts as well as operations, gaming, and field exercises did in the past� Further-
more, when using computer simulation, it is the analyst developing the models 
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and analyzing the results who derives the experience rather than those directly 
involved in making policy or military decisions� In contrast, games provide deci-
sion makers themselves with direct experience in working through anticipated 
contingencies�
Recently, DoD leadership has directed a reinvigoration of war gaming�11 The 
vast majority of games that DoD elements conduct explore a “wicked problem” 
for a day to a week to gain some insights� Characteristics of a wicked problem 
include that the problem is not understood until after the formulation of a solu-
tion, and that the solution uncovers other problems to be resolved�12 These games 
explore essentially one course of action, which is principally a function of the 
scenario and the participants in that game�
In 2003, the Naval War College initiated the Halsey series of games to provide 
students with in-depth experience in developing campaigns against potential op-
ponents they might face when occupying more-senior positions later in their ca-
reers�13 Some of these games have used a two-sided “metagame” approach for ex-
amining alternative Red (i�e�, opponent) objectives� This approach gives one side 
foresight of the other side’s strategic concept for conducting its campaign, and 
then turns the tables iteratively until neither side can do better�14 Once neither 
side can gain by changing its strategy—known in game theory as a “Nash equi-
librium”—the games move on to examine a different Red objective and campaign 
approach� This is a valuable technique that explores a broader strategy space than 
single games and leads to interesting equilibriums that suggest what would be 
reasonable behavior for the various traditional and nontraditional forces involved 
in the fight� However, the number of games a Halsey team can play is limited� The 
program began playing one game per trimester, which evolved to one iteration 
per year to allow detailed exploration of tactical and logistical details� The Halsey 
approach is unique to the Naval War College�15
Few gamers know or appreciate game theory and how it should inform their 
gaming efforts� John von Neumann initiated game theory in 1928 as a rigorous 
approach to games such as poker and to economic and sociological problems that 
“involv[e] � � � questions of parallel or opposite interest, perfect and imperfect in-
formation, free rational decision or chance influences�”16 In 1944, along with Os-
kar Morgenstern, he published these concepts in Theory of Games and Economic 
Behavior� Although the mathematics is relatively simple, game theory is arcane, 
requiring detailed study to apply, and has few military practitioners� The com-
prehensiveness of the concepts, the focus on game-theoretic “solutions,” and the 
application to economic behavior based on Homo economicus rather than deontic 
logic have deterred gamers from studying game theory, and thus the perceived 
value of applying game theory to gaming has been limited�17
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Although several papers in the 1950s and ’60s were published applying game 
theory to military topics, finding instances where game-theoretic analyses have 
influenced military decisions is rare, particularly recently�18 Whereas war games 
are rich (complex) in detail, the vast majority of game-theoretic results come 
from toy models that strip away context important to actual decision makers� 
“For some games, game theory will suggest a ‘solution’ to the game, that is a best 
way of playing the game for each person involved; but for most games describing 
real problems all it can do is rule out some types of decision and perhaps suggest 
which players will [have incentives] to work together�”19 Careful application of 
game theory can illuminate structural details underlying operational gaming that 
assist in the formulation of strategy�
The core of OR techniques involves mathematical programming for opti-
mization using deterministic models, stochastic models incorporating prob-
abilities, and statistics for estimating expectations�20 None of these techniques 
accommodate complex adaptive systems, such as human decision and learning� 
Approaches for dealing with complexity to understand the logic of the underly-
ing phenomena, enabled by advances in computer simulation and biological 
rather than statistical and mechanical paradigms, are relatively new� Techniques 
such as genetic algorithms employing fitness landscapes, cellular automata, and 
agent-based models for understanding self-organization and emergence of new 
phenomena have blossomed over the past three decades, but as yet are on the 
margins of DoD and IC analysis�21 Entities such as the Santa Fe Institute and the 
New England Complex Systems Institute have formed to bring together scholars 
from a wide range of disciplines and educate a new generation of analysts in these 
techniques�
Commercial gaming technology has advanced� Outside DoD, computerized 
games have become a ten-billion-dollar industry, with 67 percent of U�S� house-
holds playing video games for an average of eight hours per week�22 An even 
larger fraction of the population in countries such as the Republic of Korea enjoys 
computer games� Within DoD, the Naval Postgraduate School and its sponsors 
have pursued efforts such as the Army Game Project for familiarization and re-
cruiting and the Massive Multiplayer Online Wargame Leveraging the Internet 
(known as MMOWGLI) to foster innovation through crowdsourcing� The Navy 
originally developed a game for training and tactical development that became 
Harpoon Advanced Naval Warfare� Jane’s Combat Simulations / Electronic Arts 
teamed with companies that do simulation and training for DoD to produce 
games such as 688-I and Fleet Command� These games contain high-quality data 
for expected systems performance� The PLA recently developed similar games 
to promote public interest and recruitment� However, a wide gulf exists between 
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the commercial and military gaming communities, with the former incentivized 
by the entertainment value of the game and the latter emphasizing the validity of 
combat models�23
WHAT IS NEW AND WHY MIGHT IT BE SUCCESSFUL?
In a sense, this article’s central proposal is far from new� A century ago, Rear 
Admiral Bradley A� Fiske recommended a similar approach in The Navy as a 
Fighting Machine:
By this scheme, a body of officers at the Navy Department would occupy their time 
wholly in studying war problems by devising and playing strategical and tactical 
games ashore and afloat� After each problem had been solved to the satisfaction of 
the staff, each distinctive situation in the approved solution would be photographed 
in as small a space as practicable, preferably on a moving-picture film� In the solution 
of problem 99, for instance, there might be 50 situations and therefore 50 photo-
graphs� These photographs, shown in appropriate succession, would furnish informa-
tion analogous to the information imparted to a chess student by the statement of the 
successive moves in those games of chess that one sees sometimes in books on chess 
and in newspapers� Now if the film photographs were so arranged that the moves in 
the approved solution of, say, problem 99 could be thrown on a screen, as slowly and 
as quickly as desired, and if the film records of a few hundred such games could be 
conveniently arranged, a very wide range of situations that would probably come up 
in war would be portrayed; and the moves made in handling those situations would 
form valuable precedents for action, whenever situations approximating them should 
come up in war�24
Now, with the Internet, war games played anywhere, or online, can contrib-
ute to portraying a wide range of situations that probably would come up in the 
event of war� Whereas Fiske proposed using photographs, the proposed approach 
for developing and applying a theory of repeated games involves capturing, in 
extensive form, “manual” and online operational games played either sequen-
tially by one organization, along with their context; in different times and places 
by various organizations; or many times online� In manual games (which may 
employ computer calculation in adjudication and may be played online), players 
must make decisions, either simultaneously or sequentially, during each of their 
moves, taking into account what they know about the current situation; and pro-
cedures used to evaluate the consequences of the player’s decisions must be quite 
clear to the players and simple enough for the players to understand�25
Presentation of game data in extensive and strategic forms (see next section) 
allows a combination of game-theoretic and, for larger strategy spaces, complex 
adaptive science techniques to analyze the games� Given that this approach 
showed promise in analyzing the Halsey games, this type of analysis might 
be successful�26 Tapping into games played anywhere but exploring the same 
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contingency would increase the space of strategies evaluated beyond what one 
team could do at an individual institution�
Useful Elements of Game Theory
Game theory “provides a language for the description of conscious, goal-oriented 
decision making processes involving more than one individual�” It furnishes a 
methodology to make amenable to analysis such subtle concepts as state of in-
formation, choice, move, strategy, outcome, and payoff�27
Games presented in extensive form as a “tree” illustrate these concepts most 
clearly� Representing games in extensive form captures the timing of the players’ 
moves relative to relevant events and representations of what the players knew 
about others’ choices when they selected their moves� Figure 1 illustrates two 
simple, two-move games in extensive form involving players Red (R) and Blue 
(B)� The players make sequential moves in 1a, where Blue knows Red’s choice 
when making its move, and “simultaneous” moves in 1b, where both sides select 
their moves without knowing the other’s choice�28 For simplicity, these games 
represent Red having three and Blue having two choices, one branch representing 
each choice� A move involves selecting one of the possible choices—a COA� The 
moves are numbered and the outcomes are indicated with subscripts that relate 
to the players’ moves, e�g�, Oij indicates the outcome should Red select COA i 
and Blue select COA j� The payoffs to Red and Blue are indicated similarly by 
Rij and Bij, respectively� The payoffs are the value (utility) of the outcome to each 
player� Should the value of all outcomes be equal and opposite for Red and Blue 
(i�e�, Rij = –Bij for all Red COAs i and Blue COAs j), the game would be zero-sum�
Von Neumann and Morgenstern developed a method for expressing the util-
ity of an outcome to an individual player as a specific quantity� However, this 
FIGURE 1
GAMES IN EXTENSIVE (TREE) FORM
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method is difficult to employ and is made conceptually and practically much 
more difficult when attempting to quantify a single utility for multiple play-
ers representing different organizations or groups of individuals� In general, 
although some situations, such as winning or losing a duel, may be modeled 
usefully as a zero-sum game, the more complex the description of the outcome, 
the less valuable modeling the game as zero-sum is likely to be� Halsey game 
summaries provide descriptions of the tactical outcomes resulting from player 
moves and the operational outcome of the game, but the payoffs (i�e�, the player’s 
evaluation of the outcome and preferences among alternative outcomes) need to 
be inferred from the descriptions�
Figure 1b also illustrates two ways to represent simultaneous moves and the 
information available to players when they chose their next move� The bubble 
(ellipse) around the positions at which Blue selects its move indicates that Blue 
does not know which move Red has selected when it makes its choice� The lower 
figure is an alternative representation of the same situation�
In a game with more than two players, the sequence of player choices and 
moves is represented, adding to the detail above� Game controller and umpire 
decisions are treated similarly to a player’s, representing their adjudications as 
moves in the game�
If the focus of the analysis is on strategy and payoffs, representing a game 
in strategic form may be more useful than the extensive form� A two-person 
game in strategic form (also called the normal form) is represented as a two-
dimensional matrix� Each player represents a dimension, requiring games with 
three players to be drawn as cubes; games with more than three players are even 
more challenging to illustrate� Figure 2 illustrates the same games as in figure 1, 
but in strategic form�
In shifting to the strategic from the extensive form, the move sequence and 
information structure loses many details� However, the strategic form of these 
simple games shows the importance of information (intelligence)� Blue has many 
more COAs available when acting with knowledge of Red’s COA than without 
that knowledge�29 A strategy in game theory is complete description of the play, 
accounting for all contingencies� Here the strategies, or COAs, available to Blue 
going from the simultaneous to the sequential game go from selecting either 
COA 1 or 2 to selecting among eight along the lines of (1,1);(2,1);(3,1), which 
means Blue selects 1 if Red selects 1; Blue selects 1 if Red selects 2; Blue selects 1 
if Red selects 3� Blue has one COA for all combinations of the three Red moves 
and its two Blue moves� Although transitioning from a multimove game in 
extensive form to one in strategic form boils down to a matter of careful book-
keeping, accounting for all combinations of possible COAs in games with many 
moves is daunting�
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The strategic form is often easier to use than the extensive form for identify-
ing equilibrium points and any absence of a pure strategy equilibrium point.30 
Formally, an equilibrium point is “a vector of strategies such that no one player, 
regarding the others as committed to their choices, can improve his lot.”31
The Halsey Games as a Case Study
The proposition presented at the beginning of this article was that capturing the 
Halsey game moves in extensive form would provide a comprehensive way to 
illustrate the decisions that Blue and Red commanders made in executing their 
COAs so that others could see quickly what had been attempted and follow a 
narrative of what worked for each side and what did not. This would allow those 
others to benefit from the experience of the games. Also, the games in extensive 
form would allow direct alignment and analysis of multiple games played over a 
span of time.
Figure 3 diagrams Halsey game 15 in extensive form. The game begins with 
Red and Blue deployments, followed by Red considering three choices and select-
ing one. The solid line represents the move; the dashed lines represent choices 
not pursued. The numbering convention illustrates which team made the move, 
the number of the game, and the date/time of the move. The game involved Red, 
Blue, Green, and White, representing different countries. One of the Red choices 
not selected in game 15 became the Red move in game 16, which allows add-
ing game 16 to the game tree for analysis (while complicating the illustration). 
Following Red’s initial move, Red and Blue, followed by Blue and Green, made 
subsequent moves without any intelligence updates to the various role players 
on those teams, creating effectively simultaneous moves. Then the umpire and 
control team adjudicated a tactical outcome on the basis of the role player moves. 











GAMES IN STRATEGIC FORM (MATRICES)
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alternatives. The “meat” of the games is in the deliberation of alternatives.32 The 
game continued to a culminating point for the purposes of that game.33 In this 
way, the moves and outcomes for a play of a game representing one Red campaign 
approach may be captured.
Figure 4 illustrates the set of Halsey games at an operational level. Campaign-
level games began with game 10. In these games, Blue knew Red’s strategic con-
cept, though not the tactical details. Blue then gamed one of its principal strategic 
concepts against Red’s, using variations over several games, as Red also varied the 
details of its strategic concept on the basis of what had been learned in previous 
games.34 The variations did not affect the overall operational outcome resulting 
from the pair of strategic concepts, which suggests that the governing factors 
identified in the games are robust across the variations in the specific COAs 
considered. (Although Green also made moves in the games, they did not affect 
the game outcomes significantly beyond the initial game conditions, so are not 
represented in the diagram.)
Games 10–14 explored Red pursuing one campaign strategic concept, games 
15–17 explored another Red campaign strategic concept, and game 19 explored 
a third. (Game 18 explored a completely different contingency involving Red 
attacking a different opponent.) The U.S. IC provided the initial Red strategic, 
operational, and tactical concepts. The Halsey teams then refined these estimates 
as they enhanced the effectiveness of Red approaches against Blue and Green. 
FIGURE 3
HALSEY GAME 15 IN EXTENSIVE FORM 
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Blue responded with various COAs to each Red approach� The figure illustrates 
that Blue strategic concept 1 provided the best operational outcome against Red 
strategic concept 1, Blue strategic concept 2 provided the best operational out-
come against Red strategic concept 2, and Blue strategic concept 3 (combining 
several possible Blue COAs) provided the best operational outcome against Red 
strategic concept 3, of those examined� Red and Blue “other” provide place marks 
for concepts not yet examined in the Halsey series as of the date the analysis was 
conducted� The diagram provides a concise chart for an extended narrative on 
the play and outcomes� It illustrates how the games proceeded over time, with 
games 10–14 at the top, games 15–17 in the middle, and game 19 at the bottom�
The first game of a new COA spent significant time exploring the motivations 
and timing of the players’ moves for establishing the initial conditions�35 Figure 
5 depicts a typical set of decisions that Blue and Green would address in each of 
these games�
Each game began with Green and Blue either observing Red posture or receiv-
ing a démarche� Green then had to decide whether to capitulate or resist, and, if 
choosing to resist, whether to preempt Red on warning or to defend following a 
Red attack� Blue then had to choose whether to wait or come to Green’s support 
immediately� Although the Halsey team explored some branches of the tree in 
figure 5, for the purposes of the study Green always chose to resist and defend, 
and Blue to support Green� This is a type of subgame for which a rich game- 
theoretic literature exists, and one example of where existing game-theoretic 
work could be used to inform the gaming�36
FIGURE 4
HALSEY OPERATIONAL-LEVEL GAME TREE
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Gaming often is criticized for a lack of rigor and a limited ability to accumu-
late knowledge� A standard for rigor is whether another group could replay the 
game, recognizing that different player or umpire/control adjudication, including 
chance moves, will dictate different tactical outcomes, some of which may affect 
the operational outcome� The Halsey games demonstrate that, with appropriate 
documentation, games conducted by one organization sequentially, or by many 
organizations in different times and places, can be arranged to provide a detailed 
understanding of sets of feasible and acceptable tactical and operational COAs 
from Red’s perspective, and feasible and acceptable Blue COAs for each Red 
approach�37
The Halsey games demonstrated that standardized game documentation 
should include the following:
• Player moves, adjudication, and tactical outcomes using a consistent index-
ing system that identifies player, game, and time references�
• Blue should use appropriate portions of joint operations planning proce-
dures, and other teams should use their best understanding of adversary/
allied planning procedures� Benefits of using operations planning proce-
dures include both educating officers in writing orders and improving the 
use of gaming in analyzing courses of action� Using the planning proce-
dures of adversaries/allies highlights the state of understanding about how 
they approach the situation under study� The war-gaming “process high-
lights tasks that appear to be particularly important to the operation and 
provides a degree of familiarity with operational-level possibilities that 
might otherwise be difficult to achieve�”38 Educating officers in writing 
orders was a key benefit of German war gaming between the world wars�39
• The mission analysis should document COAs considered but not played�
FIGURE 5
BLUE-GREEN INITIAL SUBGAME
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• The geographic displays and synchronization matrices used in the games 
for decision making help communicate the concept of operations rapidly 
and should be part of the move documentation�
• Control logs should document the tactical outcomes from each individual 
adjudication made, providing the “true” state of the world as a conse-
quence of the adjudication�
• The tactical outcomes (intelligence updates) provided to each side, to clarify 
the information conditions�
• The control team should consider carefully the trade-off between open 
information and contingency planning� As Quade notes (from RAND’s 
experience in its SIERRA Project of gaming, which had many features 
in common with the Halsey Alfa games), having less information about 
adversary moves encourages contingency planning�40
• Routinely documenting the alternative branch points—the COAs— 
considered would suggest alternatives for future games, better support 
meshing operational games as they are played, and provide information 
needed for more in-depth, formal analysis of the games�
• Documentation of any paths that were replayed, if that occurred during the game�
Relevant combatant commanders have sought the results of the Halsey games 
to inform their planning, and the Halsey team has proposed a set of low-cost 
measures to enhance fleet capabilities to the Navy staff, some of which are being 
adopted now�
Extending the Approach to Online Gaming
Conceptually, it is also possible to capture online games in extensive form by cap-
turing the moves of each player in the game electronically, potentially expanding 
the COAs examined as more players play the game more frequently� This might 
allow the identification of equilibriums and dominant strategies that prevail 
against all adversary COAs�41 Whereas manual war games such as Halsey involve 
a mix of free-form and semirigid adjudication (using some standard calcula-
tions), online games use rigid adjudication, dictating an outcome for each inter-
action as it occurs� Games such as Fleet Command allow command organizations 
and involve adjudicating multiple tactical interactions in a game that approaches 
the operational level of war�
Online games usually specify the mission or provide a choice of missions� 
Player setup of the scenarios in such games provides much of the information 
(e�g�, friendly and enemy forces) contained in mission analyses and operations 
orders� However, the commander’s intent and concept of operations may be less 
clear in online gaming�
NWC_Spring2017Review.indb   41 2/22/17   9:32 AM
13
Hanley, Jr.: Planning for the Kamikazes - Toward a Theory and Practice of Repe
Published by U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons, 2017
 4 2  NAVA L  WA R  C O L L E G E  R E V I E W
This raises the issue of act and action meaning�
[T]he data for behavioral science are not sheer movements, but actions—that is, acts 
performed in a perspective which gives them meaning and purpose� Plainly, it is of 
crucial importance that we distinguish between the meaning of the act to the actor 
(or to other people, including ourselves, reacting with him) and its meaning to us as 
scientists, taking the action as a subject-matter� I call these, respectively, act meaning 
and action meaning� � � � The behavioral scientist must first arrive at an act meaning, 
that is, construe what conduct a particular piece of behavior represents; and then he 
must search for the meaning of the interpreted action, its interconnections with other 
actions or circumstances�42
In online gaming, capturing a move, such as one unit engaging another, repre-
sents an act meaning and is conceptually easy� However, without clear statements 
of the commander’s intent and concept of operations, the action meaning must 
be inferred�
If the objective of an analysis is merely to assess which COAs provide better 
combat outcomes, the act meaning may be sufficient, given a very large number 
of COAs being explored� No matter the intent, the moves that provide better out-
comes may be clear� Current large-scale, computer-based campaign analyses use 
this approach� However, if the game involves any forms of signaling, deterrence, 
or uses of force for influence rather than simply defeating enemy forces, captur-
ing the action meaning is essential�
Employing Game-Theoretic and Complex Systems Analyses
Since translating games in extensive form into games in strategic form is a mat-
ter of detailed bookkeeping, once games are captured in extensive form, creating 
computer programs to represent them in strategic form is feasible� Once the 
games are represented in strategic form, finding dominant strategies and equi-
libriums is conceptually straightforward� With close attention to information 
conditions, these data also could support more-sophisticated game-theoretic 
solution concepts�
The major complication is in evaluating payoffs, using the description of out-
comes� Where those contemplating an operation can review and rank outcomes 
quickly from a limited number of player-strategy pairings (or vectors, for more 
than two players), doing so for a large number of outcomes created by online 
gaming would require scoring criteria� Conceptually, the subjective judgment 
involved in selecting scoring criteria is little different from that employed in 
quantitative adjudication� Different participants will have different ideas about 
the value of a specific outcome, depending on their sophistication and ability to 
think through actions beyond the time frame and scope of the game� The com-
mander’s intent should provide the basis for evaluating outcomes, although this 
too should be evaluated for how the intent supports national security aims� For 
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Game Payoffs over Time
the process to be objective, the adjudication and scoring should be apparent to 
the players and analysts involved and allow for reclama and adjustment, if dis-
agreements occur�
Beyond game-theoretic solution concepts, these data may be used to develop 
fitness landscapes in which the height of a point on the landscape represents the 
value of the courses of action�43 The outcomes of a two-person, zero-sum game 
(where the value to one player is the negative of the value to the opponent) may 
be envisioned as a mountain range where the height of each mountain is the 
value resulting from the outcome of paired courses of action of the players� A 
player trying to minimize the maximum is akin to someone looking for the low-
est passage through the mountain range� This analogy suggests a way to capture, 
depict, and analyze the implication of the values to each player of a set of actions 
(moves)� Figure 6 depicts fitness landscapes for what payoffs might be involved 
in a two-person, zero-sum game and the payoffs to two players in a multiple-
move, non-zero-sum game, showing the payoffs over time for the COAs each 
side selects on each move�
The intuition is that, just as armies in Europe used the same routes over the 
centuries on physical landscapes to attack and retreat, fitness landscapes may an-
ticipate logical paths that a conflict could follow� The analogy of physical terrain 
to fitness landscapes could be particularly useful in understanding cyber opera-
tions, leading to traditional mission, enemy, troops, terrain, timing, and civilian 
effect analysis (referred to as METT-TC) in what is otherwise a conceptually 
challenging space to depict� More broadly, fitness landscapes may allow applica-
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IF YOU’RE SUCCESSFUL, WHAT DIFFERENCE WILL IT MAKE? 
WHAT IMPACT WILL SUCCESS HAVE? HOW WILL IT BE  
MEASURED?
The first level of success would be to involve a much broader range of national 
security professionals, particularly members of the military, in synthetic experi-
ences that would inform their preparations for operations, both in operational 
planning and force allocation and development� The second level of success 
would be to provide decision makers with deeper and more-accurate apprecia-
tions of the challenges and opportunities at hand, resulting in wiser policies and 
strategies� The third level of success would be a phase change in DoD’s and the 
IC’s analytical cultures, weaning them off methods and tools inappropriate for 
the complexity of the age�
The thresholds for the first level of success would be the extent of adoption of 
the manual operational gaming process by military colleges, then by the broader 
officer corps, and then by the Pentagon for force-development analysis� The 
threshold for the second level would be the time that senior decision makers de-
vote to gaining synthetic experience, rather than taking briefs, and the effects of 
this on security and defense policy and strategy� The threshold for the third level 
would be the extent to which this approach replaces the reliance on inappropriate 
computer combat and campaign models in DoD and supplements international 
relations / political science techniques in the IC� Using operational gaming, in 
conjunction with fleet/field exercises and complementary forms of analyses, we 
would not expect to create Hari Seldon’s psychohistory (from Isaac Asimov’s 
Foundation series), but would expect to take significant steps in understanding 
many of the factors that govern the logic of competition and cooperation�
WHAT ARE THE RISKS AND THE PAYOFFS?
The proposed approach requires multidisciplinary teams, involves both technical 
and methodological challenges, and faces headwinds from the current culture of 
and incentives enjoyed by the military modeling and simulation community and 
industry� Adoption of the approach would require military and commercial gam-
ers to work with game theorists and scholars of complex adaptive systems—each 
of whom is not fully familiar with the others’ disciplines� Currently, need-to-know 
and proprietary restrictions bar the sharing of detailed game data within DoD 
and the IC�44 This prevents accumulation of knowledge from games within these 
communities except in superficial ways� The first experiment with representing 
the Halsey set of games as a game in extensive form demonstrated challenges in 
representing actions at different echelons of command as game moves and attach-
ing values to the outcomes�45 Capturing moves and outcomes from online games 
is apparently unprecedented (although commercial games are tuned routinely as 
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players discover dominant strategies)�46 Analysis of fitness landscapes is at the 
early stage of development and has relatively few practitioners�
Employing institutions that are dedicated to education and research and have 
long experience in manual and online war gaming (such as the military colleges) 
and complexity sciences (such as the New England Complex Systems Institute) 
would mitigate the risks of experimenting and demonstrating the conceptual ap-
proach�47 In March 2016, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Commandant 
of the Marine Corps established a virtual community of practice, or vCOP, for a 
limited group of sailors, Marines, and civilians with an interest in war gaming and 
provided funding to the Naval War College to provide web-based war-gaming/
experimentation repositories�48 This effort could serve to share the data needed 
to construct and analyze games in extensive form�
The major obstacle is the analytical culture in DoD and the IC, as amplified 
by the large contract base employed in conducting analyses for these communi-
ties� The major payoff would lie in changing this culture and producing more-
insightful analysis that affects senior policy-maker and military decisions more 
frequently� Hopefully, part of DoD’s reinvigoration of gaming will result in senior 
officials taking the time to participate in games rather than just receiving brief-
ings on them�
HOW MUCH WILL IT COST?
The answer depends on the scale of the effort� The principal costs are in creating 
interdisciplinary teams, some of whose members may be part-time consultants� 
A team should consist of leads from military planning and gaming, a lead who 
has experience working with the commercial gaming industry, a game theorist, 
and a complex adaptive systems lead with experience in fitness landscapes� Con-
sultants should include those familiar with combat/campaign models, statistics, 
behavioral economics, history, and political science (preferably with experience 
in agent-based models)� Software licenses likely would be required for commer-
cial gaming technology� Establishing standards and training war-gamers for data 
collection would entail additional costs� Several million dollars per year should 
be sufficient to develop the practice and exploitation of repeated gaming�
HOW LONG WILL IT TAKE?
This program should use rapid spiral development� Four years should be suf-
ficient to make or break the concept, although early failures can be anticipated� 
The aim for the first year should be to establish game documentation and shar-
ing standards, while using commercial games to demonstrate the techniques 
required for online gaming� Military college and other DoD/IC game data 
should be available in the second year to learn what works and to transition the 
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theoretical approach into early practice� A focus on cyber warfare, with the aim 
of developing and analyzing cyber fitness landscapes, would test the limits of the 
concept�
WHAT ARE THE MIDTERM AND FINAL “EXAMS” TO CHECK FOR 
SUCCESS? HOW WILL PROGRESS BE MEASURED?
Early elements required for success are the ability to document and share manual 
games, and to track online game moves and outcomes and represent them as 
games in extensive and strategic forms and as fitness landscapes� The next exam 
would be the ability to derive the logic of the competition from game-theoretic 
analyses and these landscapes� Then the measures of adoption discussed above 
will come into play�
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